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Terrorist v Sovereign: Legal 
performances in a state of exception
Nicole Rogers
Stephen Sewell’s (2003) play Myth, Propaganda and Disaster in Nazi 
Germany and Contemporary America (hereinafter Myth) depicts the 
fate of Talbot, an Australian academic working in New York, whose 
outspoken criticism of American complacency in the post–September 
11 environment is ruthlessly punished by a representative of the state 
known only as the Man. The task of the Man is to reveal to Talbot 
that he, Talbot, is blinded by myth and propaganda, in his case the 
myth of liberalism and its associated rhetoric of human rights, and that 
it is in fact violence and power which define truth in contemporary 
America. The Man identifies himself only as Talbot’s ‘ judge and jury’, 
his ‘confessor’, with the stated role of ‘facilitat[ing his] return to reality’ 
(Sewell 2003: 20).
The Man quotes the first line of Kafka’s The Trial when he initially 
visits Talbot (Sewell 2003: 21); this is apposite, given the parallels 
between Talbot’s story and that of Joseph K in The Trial. Myth and The 
Trial are both about the inexorable pursuit, and eventual execution, 
of an individual by an extra-judicial body which operates outside the 
legal system. In both works of fiction the individual is never offered an 
explanation of his crime and tries to resist the process by resorting to 
ineffectual tools: the rhetoric of due process, ordinary legal procedures 
and rational argument. Even when confronted by the Man’s escalating 
violence, Talbot continues to defend his faith in legal principles, truth 
and reason: ‘you just can’t move into someone’s life and start monstering 
them’ (Sewell 2003: 46). Talbot describes the Man’s behaviour as ‘a 
grave infringement of my rights’ (Sewell 2003: 67), only to be told that 
‘you don’t have any rights’ (Sewell 2003: 67), that ‘your world doesn’t 
mean shit’ (Sewell 2003: 43) and that there is no ‘right to freedom of 
thought’ (Sewell 2003: 84).
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The violence which the play depicts is extra-legal violence intended 
to silence dissenters. Sewell is describing an orchestrated and brutal 
assault on the ideas which challenge the authority and supportive 
myths of an increasingly repressive state. The title of his play is drawn 
from Talbot’s own work-in-progress and, as it would suggest, in that 
book Talbot draws a number of parallels between Nazi Germany 
and contemporary America. The accuracy of Talbot’s observations 
is highlighted by the violence which is unleashed upon him as a 
consequence of his politically unacceptable views. Talbot’s book is 
part of a work of fiction, but various scholars, including Naomi Wolf 
(2007), have similarly argued that there are similarities between the 
Third Reich and the Bush administration. Wolf has not, as far as we 
know, been subjected to the brutality experienced by Talbot but it 
has been reported that a United States academic, who referred to the 
victims in the World Trade Centre as ‘little Eichmanns’, lost his job 
(The Sydney Morning Herald 26 August 2007).
The world Sewell describes, in which legal rights have been 
superseded by acts of brutality orchestrated by the executive, and 
individuals have no recourse to the protection offered by fundamental 
human rights, resembles the exception or emergency situation first 
investigated by German theorist and Nazi supporter Carl Schmitt. 
Schmitt’s work is ‘experiencing a timely or untimely renaissance’ 
(Sharpe 2006: 97) in a political environment characterised by loss of 
liberties, an unprecedented level of executive control and a perceived 
erosion of the rule of law. A number of theorists, including Georgio 
Agamben, believe that this political landscape is best characterised as 
a state of exception, which now prevails as ‘the dominant paradigm of 
government in contemporary politics’ (Agamben 2005: 2). According 
to such reasoning, the state of exception described in Myth is not, 
therefore, merely a work of fiction. In particular, Guantanamo Bay 
is portrayed as a contemporary state of exception, a legal black hole 
which is ‘entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight’ 
(Agamben 2005: 4), although this view is not universally held. Fleur 
Johns has argued, for instance, that the regime at Guantanamo Bay 
displays an ‘over-abundance of legal procedures, and regulatory 
161
Terrorist v Sovereign
effects’ (2005: 614) and is far from being representative of ‘Schmittian 
exceptionalism’ (2005: 631).
The purpose of this article is to draw upon, and interrogate, 
Agamben’s thesis on the contemporary state of exception by exploring 
the function and role of a number of recent legal proceedings in 
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.  I shall focus 
predominantly, although not exclusively, on legal contests between 
the state and the accused terrorist.
The sovereign, homo sacer and 
the state of exception
Carl Schmitt believed that the exception lay outside the legal order 
(1985: 7) and that the rule of law was not applicable within the 
framework of the exception. His ideas have attracted a considerable 
amount of attention in the contemporary Western polit ical 
environment, in which recurrent references to exceptionalism can be 
found in popular and official discourses, and suggestions that the rule 
of law should be set aside have been made by representatives of both 
the Blair and Bush governments (Dyzenhaus 2006: 1). Various legal 
theorists, including Bruce Ackerman, Cass Sunstein and Oren Gross, 
have endorsed Schmitt’s views and argued that judges have only a 
minimalist role to play in the current state of exception. Furthermore, 
Agamben has been accused of an uncritical engagement with Schmitt’s 
theory of exception (Sharpe 2006: 101).
According to Agamben, the distinguishing feature of the state 
of exception is that, within this realm, law merges with life. The 
state of exception is exemplified by the concentration camps of Nazi 
Germany (Agamben 1998: 20); Guantanamo Bay is a contemporary 
example. The critical point made by Agamben is that, far from being 
the exception, the state of exception has ‘reached its maximum 
worldwide deployment’ (2005: 87). In the modern configuration of 
the state of exception, individual liberties are no longer protected by 
constitutional guarantees or constitutional norms, and the executive’s 
powers are significantly enhanced such that its decrees have the force of 
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law (Agamben 2005: 5). The distinction between legislative, executive 
and judicial powers becomes blurred or disappears (Agamben 2005: 
7). As the state of exception acquires an increasingly universal political 
relevance, ‘bare life’ has become a central part of the political order 
(Agamben 1998: 9), and the camp has become ‘the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of the West’ (Agamben 1998: 181).
Agamben draws upon or arguably completes Foucault’s work 
on biopolitics (1998: 9), which encompasses the ‘growing inclusion 
of man’s natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of power’ 
(1998: 119). In doing so, he contemplates the role and nature of his 
‘protaganist’, homo sacer or bare life (1998: 8). Homo sacer, originally 
an ‘obscure figure of ancient Roman law’ (Agamben 1998: 8), is 
the scapegoat without legal status; excluded from the ‘city of men’; 
abandoned by the law; ‘exposed and threatened on the threshold’ 
between life and law (1998: 28) like an unwanted foundling. This 
vulnerable figure can be killed with impunity, and the violence of his 
killing falls outside ‘the sanctioned forms of both human and divine 
law’ (1998: 82). Significantly, Agamben places homo sacer outside 
‘the mediations of the law’ (Fitzpatrick 2001: 258) but, as Fitzpatrick 
points out, at least two of the Roman authors on which Agamben 
relies argued that homo sacer could be incorporated within the legal 
order and judged, possibly by way of trial (2001: 256–7).
Agamben asserts that ‘we are all virtually homines sacri’ (1998: 
115), but it is easier to discern the characteristics of homo sacer in 
a more discrete group: the individuals accused of terrorist offences 
or suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activities. These 
individuals, stripped of basic rights, surveilled by the state, subjected 
to house arrest or even more extreme forms of violent detention by 
the state, can be readily identified as the contemporary incarnation of 
homo sacer. However, since such individuals are able to mount legal 
challenges against these forms of surveillance and control by the state, 
they do not share the central defining characteristic of homo sacer: 
that of being outside the law.
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Agamben distinguishes his approach from that of Foucault in that 
he focuses on the connection between biopolitics and sovereignty, or 
the ‘hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and 
the biopolitical models of power’ (Agamben 1998: 6). He acknowledges 
an unlikely symmetry and relationship between homo sacer, controlled 
and disciplined by the biopolitical mechanisms which characterise 
the contemporary political era, and the sovereign, who creates and 
administers such biopolitical strategies. Both homo sacer and the 
sovereign are, for different reasons, outside the law, and thus they 
represent ‘the two poles of the sovereign exception’ (Agamben 1998: 
110). This point is made with some poignancy by Terry Hicks, the 
father of David Hicks who, for so long, in his extended incarceration 
in Guantanamo Bay, exemplified homo sacer; Terry has marvelled over 
the fact that his son’s name is so frequently mentioned by President 
Bush (Souter 2006). Others have observed that the sovereign and 
the terrorist are linked in the ‘war against terrorism’ discourse. Anna 
Szorenyi and Juliet Rogers argue that ‘the sovereign in contemporary 
legal discourse is located vis-à-vis the terrorist’ and that terrorism, 
which is ‘an injury to the body sovereign’, provides meaning for the 
sovereign figure (2006: 11).
There is no doubt that legal contests between the accused terrorist 
and the sovereign are occurring with some frequency in the state 
of exception which arguably characterises contemporary Western 
societies. Their very occurrence could be perceived as an anomaly given 
the theoretical parameters of the state of exception as a lawless void. 
However, Agamben describes a relationship of mutual dependency 
in which the judicial order ‘must seek in every way to assure itself 
a relation’ with this ‘space devoid of law’ (2005:51). In any event, 
some of these ‘legal’ performances, for instance those staged by the 
Bush administration in processing the Guantanamo Bay detainees, 
are quasi-legal proceedings and not necessarily representative of 
the rule of law. Fleur Johns rejects this conclusion and contends 
that the regime at Guantanamo Bay is, in fact, ‘a profoundly anti-
exceptional legal artefact’ (2005: 615) with no space for option, doubt 
and responsibility in the legal procedures which apply therein. This 
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description, however, suggests bureaucracy rather than law — the 
sort of murderous bureaucracy which engendered mass genocide 
during the Third Reich: the ‘governmental violence that — while 
ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state 
of exception internally — nevertheless still claims to be applying the 
law’ (Agamben 2005: 87).
In fact, the legal performances which are taking place in the 
contemporary state of exception can be divided into three categories. In 
the first category we find the true legal black holes, in which the courts 
refuse to judge the actions of the executive. Yet such performances are 
limited in number. More common are the second category of legal 
performances, in which the courts conduct only a procedural review 
and ignore the substance of the rule of law (Dyzenhaus 2006: 35). 
From these performances emerge what David Dyzenhaus has labelled 
the legal grey holes — far more dangerous, in his view, than the black 
holes (2006: 50) because in deferring to the executive the judiciary 
‘place a thin veneer of legality on the political’ (2006: 39). Into this 
category fall challenges by accused terrorists to varying circumstances 
of non-criminal detention, rigorous conditions of surveillance and 
extreme restrictions on their freedom of movement and association. 
In the final category, however, we find legal contests between accused 
terrorists and the sovereign in which, despite the deployment of 
biopolitical strategies and an overt display of intimidatory force on 
the part of the sovereign, the courts have demonstrated an adherence 
to the rule of law and a resistance to the Kafka-esque qualities of the 
state of exception. In this final category of legal performances the 
sovereign is indeed constrained by the rule of law.
Black holes
The existence of legal black holes is apparent in two legal performances 
in which political activists argued that the decision on the part of the 
United States and its allies to wage war on Iraq lacked legitimacy. The 
courts made it clear that such decisions could not be reviewed by the 
judiciary. One of these cases resulted in a statement of reasons as to 
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why a law student could not bring a common informer suit against 
the Prime Minister of Australia in relation to his role in the Iraq war; 
the other case was a House of Lords decision on whether the alleged 
illegitimacy of Britain’s act of aggression in Iraq provided a defence 
for activists accused of various criminal acts carried out at military 
and air bases in England.
In 2004, Eric Bateman, a law student, attempted to bring a common 
informer suit against the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, 
under the Common Informers (Parliamentary Disqualifications) Act 1975 
(Cth). In a statement of claim, which the High Court of Australia 
Registry ultimately rejected, Bateman argued that Howard’s actions, 
including, most importantly, his decision to follow the United States 
into war in Iraq, amounted to an acknowledgment of allegiance 
to a foreign power. This, according to Bateman, disqualifed the 
Prime Minister from continuing to sit as a member of the Australian 
Parliament under section 44 of the Australian Constitution.
In his statement of reasons for refusing Eric’s application to have a 
writ of summons issued, Gummow J stated that:
The question which the Constitution would present is not whether the 
Prime Minister has conducted himself in a particular way but whether, as a 
matter of law, he is ‘under’ any acknowledgment of ‘allegiance, obedience 
or adherence to a foreign power’ within the meaning of s 44(i) (In the 
matter of an application by Eric Bateman: 2–3).
Of course, the Constitution does not ‘present’ a question so clearly. 
The High Court of Australia was expressing, rather, a clear reluctance 
to judge the legal consequences of the political decision-making of the 
executive arm of government, a reluctance which is mirrored in the 
next case study. The 2006 House of Lords decision in R v Jones also 
suggests that the courts are not prepared to support attempts by activists 
to challenge the decision of their government to engage in war.
In February and March 2003 the appellants carried out various 
criminal acts on English military air bases including damaging fuel 
tankers and bomb trailers, damaging a runway and aircraft, destroying 
a fence, trespassing and chaining themselves to tanks and vehicles. 
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Although such acts involved force and the perpetrators had political 
motives, they were not prosecuted for terrorist offences or labelled 
‘terrorists’. The appellants argued that their actions were lawful 
‘because they were aimed at preventing a greater evil, namely the war 
in Iraq and its probable consequences’ (R v Jones: 43). The House of 
Lords dismissed this argument. Lord Hoffman expressed the strongest 
sentiments in response to the defendants’ arguments.
Lord Hoffman acknowledged the ‘theoretical difficulty in the 
Courts, as part of the State, holding that the State has acted unlawfully’ 
(R v Jones: 65). Furthermore, ‘the decision to go to war, whether one 
thinks it was right or wrong, fell squarely within the discretionary 
powers of the Crown to defend the realm and conduct its foreign 
affairs’ (R v Jones: 66).
Lord Hoffman commented that one of the defendants had portrayed 
herself as ‘a lonely individual resisting the acts of a hostile and alien 
State to which she owes no loyalty’ (R v Jones: 75). He found this 
puzzling given that the state in question had ‘protected and sustained 
her’ and ‘the legal system which had to judge the reasonableness of 
her actions was that of the United Kingdom itself ’ (R v Jones: 75). 
Here the judge drew a distinction between the British state, which 
he perceived as benevolent, and oppressive regimes such as the Nazi 
regime in World War II. This distinction, according to Agamben, 
is illusory; he argues that in the age of biopolitics there is an ‘inner 
solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism’ (1998: 10) and, in 
fact, democracies and totalitarian regimes are indistinguishable and 
interchangeable (1998: 122). Given the judge’s partial view of the state, 
it is unsurprising that he and the other judges condemned the use of 
force by citizens in an attempt ‘to see the law enforced in the interests 
of the community at large’ and stated that ‘the law will not tolerate 
vigilantes’ (R v Jones: 83).
Lord Hoffman concluded his judgment with strong criticism of 
the strategy of activists to use the courts as a forum for challenging the 
legitimacy of state acts, including acts of war; he called this ‘litigation 
as the continuation of protest by other means’ (R v Jones: 90). The 
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court’s refusal to look behind the state’s use of force and interrogate the 
legitimacy of the decision to go to war delineates a classic legal black 
hole: an area into which the rule of law does not extend.
The refusal on the part of the courts to judge certain forms of 
executive decision-making is not unique to the contemporary state 
of exception. Well before the onset of the war on terror Robert 
Cover alluded to the ‘apologetic and statist orientation of current 
jurisdictional understandings’ which ‘prevents courts from ever 
reaching the threatening questions’ (1992a: 159), and to the ‘very 
common paradox of jurisdiction’ (1992a: 179) contained in the law in 
the Talmud: namely, ‘The king does not judge and we do not judge 
him’.  It is worth noting, however, that where legal black holes exist 
activists have staged extra-legal proceedings in an attempt to hold the 
executive accountable for its decisions. The refusal on the part of the 
courts in the United States to respond to challenges to the Vietnam war 
(Cover 1992b: 198) motivated philosophers Bertrand Russell and Jean-
Paul Sartre to create their own International War Crimes Tribunal, 
which would determine whether the United States government had 
committed acts of aggression and whether other governments had been 
complicit in these acts (Cover 1992b: 199). Russell and Sartre argued 
that it was necessary to set up the trial because neither governments 
nor the people were prepared to do so (Cover 1992b: 200).
In the contemporary context of the war on terror, the self-styled 
World Tribunal on Iraq considered the legitimacy of the Iraqi war in 
twenty hearings held in different cities, concluding that the perpetrators 
of the war were guilty of violations in international law. The tribunal 
claimed that its own legitimacy was ‘located in the collective conscience 
of humanity’. A more overtly theatrical challenge to the sovereign can 
be found in the staging of the trial of British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
at London’s Tricycle Theatre in April and May 2007 (Riding 2007). 
In preparing for Called to Account — The Indictment of Anthony Charles 
Lynton Blair for the crime of aggression against Iraq — A Hearing, journalist 
Richard Norton-Taylor and director Nicolas Kent created their own 
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trial of Blair in which prominent barristers cross-examined witnesses 
who had been directly involved in the build-up to the Iraq war.
Terrorist v sovereign: the grey holes
In the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, accused 
terrorists have mounted a succession of legal challenges to their 
indefinite detention by the executive, or to extreme restrictions on their 
freedom of movement and association. The courts have been prepared 
to concede that they have jurisdiction to hear such challenges, even 
in situations in which there have been no clear precedents. However, 
in general the courts have adopted a procedural approach, ensuring 
that the executive can exercise such powers over accused terrorists 
provided that such powers are conferred in validly enacted legislation. 
Thus the rule of law is diluted, and the courts have deferred to ‘the 
executive’s judgment about what is required’ (Dyzenhaus 2006: 19). 
Dyzenhaus believes that such judgments are far more destructive of 
the rule of law than is the judicial recognition and acknowledgement 
of legal black holes (2006: 5).
A good example of the potentially broad ambit of the courts’ 
jurisdiction in relation to such challenges can be found in the Australian 
Federal Court’s ruling in Hicks v Ruddock. In this ruling the court 
held that David Hicks’s challenge to the refusal on the part of the 
Australian Government to request his release from Guantanamo Bay 
was justiceable, and dismissed the Commonwealth’s argument that it 
was not appropriate for the court to rule on the lawfulness or otherwise 
of particular political decisions and actions on the part of the Australian 
and United States governments. Tamberlin J concluded that ‘there are 
no bright lines which foreclose, at this pleading stage, the arguments 
sought to be advanced in the present case’ (Hicks v Ruddock: [93]).
However, the judge emphasised that his decision by no means paved 
the way for a successful outcome to Hicks’s challenge (Hicks v Ruddock: 
Explanatory Statement); the significance of the case was simply that 
Hicks’s challenge could be heard. Hicks’s subsequent release from 
Guantanamo Bay has left unanswered the question of whether the 
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court would have been prepared to curtail the discretionary powers 
of the Australian state in relation to accused terrorists and to declare 
certain actions and decisions on the part of the Australian and United 
States governments unlawful. The critical issues underpinning the 
challenge, ‘the relationship between the Judiciary and the Executive’, 
or between the rule of law and the executive, and ‘the relationship 
between the protection of individual liberty and the national interest’ 
(Hicks v Ruddock: Explanatory Statement), will not now be resolved 
by the court in the context of Hicks’s detention.
The court has been prepared to apply the rule of law in some of 
the challenges brought by accused terrorists against the executive. 
Stephen Humphreys cites the cases of A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department and Rasul v Bush as examples of decisions which ‘hold 
out — however temporarily — against the encroachment of rule by 
exception’ (Humphreys 2006: 686). In the first of these cases the House 
of Lords ended the indefinite detention of non-citizen terrorist suspects 
in Belmarsh prison on the basis that the government was acting in 
a discriminatory fashion. In the second, the United States Supreme 
Court held that non-citizen terrorist suspects detained at Guantanamo 
Bay were entitled to habeas corpus review within the United States 
judicial system. Humphreys argues that in both cases the courts were 
conferring rights on homo sacer, ‘an outcome which suggests at least 
the relevance of a judicial role to Agamben’s story’ (2006: 687).
In most cases, however, in which challenges to executive power have 
been mounted by an accused terrorist, there has been no substantive 
victory for the rule of law but rather the rule by law approach deplored 
by Dyzenhaus, with its careful attention to procedure. Hamdan v 
Rumsfeld (hereinafter Hamdan), which involved a challenge by a 
Guantanamo Bay detainee to the exercise of sovereign power by the 
United States executive government, provides an example of this 
approach. The case could be read as an attempt on the part of the court 
to rein in the power of the sovereign and assert the pre-eminence 
of the rule of law. Certainly Stevens J in his majority judgment in 
Hamdan held that ‘in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to 
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criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule 
of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction’ (Hamdan: 2798). However 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court did not effectively 
curtail the power of the executive; in ruling that military commissions 
contravened the international law of war as contained in Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and were thus invalid, the 
majority judges nevertheless invited the President to seek an appropriate 
authorisation for such military commissions from Congress (Hamdan: 
2799). The judges pointed out that the requirement for compliance 
with Common Article 3 could be waived by Congress, and that ‘the 
rules of most relevance here are those pertaining to the authority of 
Congress and the interpretation of its enactments’ (Hamdan: 2799). 
President Bush acted upon this suggestion in securing the passage of 
the Military Commissions Act through Congress in October 2006, and 
thereby established an almost identical replacement regime of military 
commissions.
In Hamdan v Rumsfeld, therefore, the glaring procedural problems 
with the first military commissions, including the excessive degree 
of executive interference in, and control of, the proceedings, and the 
failure to observe fundamental standards of fairness, were problematic 
only because Congress had imposed a statutory requirement in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice that military commissions must 
conform to the law of war. The case did not contain a clear statement 
from the highest court in the United States that the executive must 
always respect fundamental legal safeguards; instead, by resorting to 
principles of statutory interpretation, the majority judges decided an 
‘extraordinary’ case in accordance with ‘ordinary rules’ (Hamdan: 
2799).
In considering the validity of control orders on accused terrorists or 
terrorist suspects, the courts have also adopted a procedural approach. 
Control orders, which fetter an individual’s freedom of movement, 
communication and association in varying degrees of severity, are, as 
Humphreys has pointed out, clearly biopolitical strategies (2006: 687); 
as the name would suggest, the sovereign seeks to control homo sacer 
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through disciplinary techniques and continuous surveillance. Control 
orders reflect the central focus in modern democracies on ‘bare life’ 
as the ‘political subject’ (Agamben 1998: 123). In challenges mounted 
by accused terrorists to control orders, the courts have accepted that 
control orders are a valid component of the new legislative framework 
developed in response to the threat of terrorism.
In a key constitutional decision in 2007, Thomas v Mowbray, the 
High Court of Australia upheld the validity of Division 104 of the 
Criminal Code, pursuant to which a federal magistrate had issued an 
interim control order against Jack Thomas within a week after his 
conviction was overturned by the Victorian Court of Appeal. Although 
then Australian Attorney-General Philip Ruddock claimed that ‘the 
issue is about protecting the Australian community and not punishing 
a person for an offence’ (Robinson & Davis 2006), the imposition 
of the control order looked like the latest attempt on the part of the 
state to identify Thomas publicly as a terrorist and impose special 
restrictions which isolated him, at least to a limited degree, from the 
rest of the community. As Kirby J noted, ‘this sequence of events 
inevitably gave rise to an appearance, in the plaintiff ’s case, of action 
by the Commonwealth designed to thwart the ordinary operation 
of the criminal law and to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the 
liberty he temporarily enjoyed pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s 
orders’ (Thomas v Mowbray: [182]). In fact the control order was hardly 
the most effective way to protect the community from terrorism; if 
Thomas were indeed a sleeper agent it would have been more strategic 
to engage in covert surveillance and track down Thomas’s associates. 
One commentator observed that the control order made Thomas ‘an 
investigative dead end’ (Hartcher 2006).
The restrictions placed on Thomas’s freedom of movement, 
association and communication were considerable, as were the 
authorised levels of state surveillance. He was expected to stay home 
between midnight and 5.00 am each day and to report to the police 
three times a week; he was also prevented from leaving Australia 
without police permission. The legislation was challenged on the 
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grounds, firstly, that there was no head of legislative power to support it, 
and secondly, as contrary to Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, 
which ‘gives practical effect to the assumption of the rule of law upon 
which the Constitution depends for its efficacy’ (Thomas v Mowbray: 
[61]).
A significant consideration for the majority judges was the existence 
of a sequence of analogous court orders which curtailed the liberty of 
individuals but did not amount to detention (Thomas v Mowbray: [16], 
[79], [116]–[119]). However, such reasoning was rejected by Kirby 
J in his dissenting judgment, in which he described the impugned 
legislative provisions as ‘unique’, ‘exceptional’ and ‘an attempt to 
break new legislative ground’ (Thomas v Mowbray: [331]). Kirby J 
was scathing in his condemnation of the ‘legal and constitutional 
exceptionalism’ which, in his view, characterised the legislative scheme 
(Thomas v Mowbray: [388]). In particular, he deplored the subservience 
of the courts to the will of the executive: he stated that ‘in effect, and 
in substance, the federal courts are rendered rubber stamps for the 
assertions of officers of the Executive government’ (Thomas v Mowbray: 
[369]). Here we find a powerful judicial critique of legal grey holes 
in which the courts provide a façade of legality for the actions of the 
executive while the rule of law is undermined.
Interestingly enough, one of the majority judges, Gleeson CJ, 
suggested that a problematic consequence of placing control orders 
outside the powers of the federal judiciary would be the consignment of 
this area to the executive, an outcome which would not be conducive 
to the protection of human rights (Thomas v Mowbray: [17]). However, 
the second dissenter, Hayne J, indicated that in his view legislation 
which conferred an equivalent power to issue control orders on the 
executive would not necessarily be valid (Thomas v Mowbray: [506]).
In a sequence of English judgments which were handed down at 
approximately the same time as Thomas v Mowbray, the House of Lords 
looked at the legality of non-derogating control orders issued against six 
respondents suspected of, but certainly not charged with or prosecuted 
for, terrorist activity. A number of issues relating to the application of 
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the European Convention on Human Rights were considered by the 
court, and a detailed examination of these lies beyond the scope of 
this article. What was revealing, in exposing the biopolitical thrust of 
modern democracies, was the willingness on the part of the law lords 
to consider exactly how many hours of involuntary confinement to 
one’s house amounted to a deprivation of liberty. Eighteen hours of 
confinement, and associated restrictions on movement, communication 
and visitors, were considered excessive by a narrow majority in the case 
of JJ (Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ). However, a 14-hour 
curfew in the case of AF (Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
MB (FC); Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (FC)) was 
not, nor was the 12-hour curfew imposed on E (Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v E). Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in 
particular was quite prepared to state that ‘the acceptable limit was 16 
hours [of confinement], leaving the suspect with 8 hours (admittedly 
in various respects controlled) liberty a day’ (Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v JJ: [105]). The peculiarly biopolitical strategy of 
attaching electronic tags to suspected terrorists was also accepted by 
the law lords.
The above discussion reveals that, in general, the courts are 
prepared to limit their scrutiny of dealings by the executive with 
accused terrorists to procedural reviews in which substantive issues 
are glossed over. The biopolitical tactics deployed by the state in 
supervising and controlling the movements and activities of accused 
terrorists have not been invalidated by the courts. The abundance of 
legal grey holes in this area lends support for Agamben’s claim that 
the state of exception has now become the norm. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, in other forms of legal contests between the state and the 
accused terrorist, the rule of law has been applied. I turn now to the 
Australian terror trials.
Sovereign v terrorist: the terror trials
Trials can be viewed as law as propaganda (Boorstin 1971: 96). As 
state-orchestrated spectacle, the Australian terror trials are intended 
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to reinforce certain messages: specifically, that Australia is at high risk 
of terrorist attacks, that individuals and groups within Australia are 
currently engaged in preparing for these attacks and, furthermore, 
that terrorist attacks on Australian soil have been avoided thus far by 
the diligence and hard work of the Australian Federal Police and the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in pre-empting 
and thwarting terrorist attacks by bringing would-be terrorists to trial. 
To ensure that such messages are effectively conveyed, the members of 
the Australian Federal Police have been directed to lay as many charges 
as possible under the new terrorism legislation (Allard 2007b).
These messages can be found in, for instance, Cummins J’s 
judgment in the 2006 trial of Jack Thomas. Cummins J emphasised 
the importance of the ‘principle of general deterrence’ in the context 
of terrorism (Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Thomas 2006b: [14]). 
The Attorney-General also emphasised that successful prosecutions 
of individuals in Thomas’s situation would have a deterrent effect. 
According to Ruddock, the outcome of the trial, which resulted in 
two convictions, demonstrated ‘the seriousness with which these issues 
are dealt with by the law and highlights the consequences of becoming 
involved in these activities’ (Munro 2006).
The message of deterrence can further be found in statements 
by the government and court in relation to the 2006 trial of Faheen 
Khalid Lodhi. After the verdict had been handed down in this trial, 
a spokesperson from the Australian Federal Police commented that 
the conviction demonstrated the determination of the Australian 
government and its security apparatus ‘to counter any attempts of 
terrorist activities on Australian soil’ (King & O’Brien 2006). In 
sentencing Lodhi, Whealy J identified the ‘obligation of the Court’ as 
being ‘to denounce terrorism and voice its stern disapproval of activities 
such as those contemplated by the offender here’ (R v Lodhi: [92]).
The performances of the terror trials are designed to supplement 
and reinforce the strategies of the state in fighting its domestic ‘war 
against terrorism’; they are intended to be massively publicised 
ceremonies in which the terrorist is prosecuted, convicted and then 
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isolated from the community in extremely punitive circumstances. 
Philip Boulten, Lodhi’s barrister, believes that the exceptional 
circumstances of the terrorism trials, characterised by metal detectors, 
an over-abundance of lawyers and the invasion of the courtroom by 
the state’s security apparatus, create a ‘forceful and theatrical statement’ 
about the state’s view of the accused (Boulten 2007). He has stated 
that ‘the jury are quick to perceive the nature of the struggle, when 
the state is waging war on terror in the courtroom’ (Madden 2007). 
In the trials themselves, and in the preliminary proceedings, we find 
a representation of the accused terrorist as homo sacer.
Most terrorist suspects are denied bail.  The accused terrorists 
experience the most extreme security conditions, virtual solitary 
confinement, continuous surveillance and extraordinary security when 
attending court. Lodhi appeared at his trial shackled at the ankles, 
arms and waist (Wallace 2006). At his committal hearing, Thomas 
was accompanied by four guards in body armour and extra court staff 
wearing sidearms (Epstein 2004). The thirteen men arrested in the 
November 2005 raids in Melbourne and the nine men arrested in 
the same raids in Sydney attended their committal hearing in a dock 
encased in armoured glass (Kennedy & Allard 2007, Hoare 2006). This 
is not without precedent; the 1961 Israeli trial of the Nazi war criminal 
Eichmann also featured the court appearances of the defendant within 
a bullet-proof glass box (Schechner 2002: 177). Terrorist suspects have 
been dressed in orange overalls, thereby evoking comparisons with 
Guantanamo Bay detainees.
This treatment is clearly dehumanising. It corresponds to the 
process of ‘bestialization of the human’ which Judith Butler has 
described in relation to the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay. She writes that in such oppressive conditions of imprisonment 
‘there is a reduction of these human beings to animal status, where the 
animal is figured as out of control, in need of total constraint’ (Butler 
2004: 78). The representation of accused terrorists as less than human 
corresponds with one of the mythical archetypes of homo sacer: the 
werewolf, ‘a monstrous hybrid of human and animal’ (Agamben 1998: 
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105). Agamben argues that in the state of exception ‘the city is dissolved 
and men enter into a zone in which they are no longer distinct from 
beasts’ (1998: 107).
It is not simply the conditions in which the trials are conducted, 
and the visible degradation of the accused terrorists to beings less than 
human, which suggest a state of exception.  The evidence provided by 
the prosecution in the terror trials also supports a conclusion that the 
courts are operating within a state of exception in which an apparently 
innocent sequence of events can inexplicably trigger prosecution and the 
imposition of harsh punitive penalties. Agamben repeatedly describes 
the state of exception as a place in which fact is indistinguishable from 
law (2005: 29). Peter Fitzpatrick has questioned whether the legal 
question can ever be strictly distinguished from the factual question 
(2001: 262). However, this merging of fact and law is certainly apparent 
in the Lodhi trial, in which the evidence regarding Lodhi’s activities 
was not necessarily incriminating: the collection of two maps of the 
Australian electricity system, a request for information about materials 
which could be used to make explosives, the downloading of aerial 
photographs of Australian defence establishments, and the possession 
of a document describing how to make various poisons and explosives. 
Evidence about his purchase of a large amount of toilet paper, which 
could produce nitrocellulose for a bomb, formed the basis of a further 
count (later dropped) in the original indictment. Such conduct could 
not be described as transgressive and was clearly capable of innocent 
explanation. Yet it is in accordance with the arbitrary decision-making 
processes of the state that the author of such conduct is labelled a 
terrorist. This confusion between transgression and compliance with 
the law, ‘such that what violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide 
without any remainder’ (Agamben 1998: 57), is a central paradox of 
the state of exception.
Yet despite the apparently absolute control which the state 
exercises over these legal performances, despite the representation of 
the defendants as homo sacer and the state’s labelling of seemingly 
innocuous conduct as transgressive, at least two of these trials have in 
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fact assumed the form of law as failed propaganda and the rule of law 
has prevailed. There has been only one successful prosecution, that 
of Lodhi, and the verdict is even now, at the time of writing, being 
appealed. The evidence amassed by the state against two other men 
accused of terrorism, Jack Thomas and Izhar Ul-Haque, has been 
dismissed as tainted by, respectively, the Victorian Court of Appeal 
and the New South Wales Supreme Court.
In the Thomas case, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal set 
aside the two convictions on the basis that the prosecution had relied 
on statements obtained from Thomas under conditions of inducement 
and pressure, and these statements were therefore inadmissible (R v 
Thomas: [92]–[94]). Thomas is currently facing a re-trial on the basis 
of separate admissions, which were broadcast in a Four Corners program 
on the day after his conviction. In the case of Ul-Haque, Adams J 
was scathingly critical of the interrogation methods utilised by ASIO 
officers and members of the Federal Police. According to Adams J, the 
ASIO officers were guilty of criminal offences of false imprisonment 
and kidnapping (R v Ul-Haque: [62]) and the conduct of both ASIO 
and Australian Federal Police officers was oppressive (R v Ul-Haque: 
[98]). In Adams J’s view, the state is clearly subject to the rule of law. 
The violations and ‘gross interference with the accused’s legal rights as 
a citizen’ — rights which, according to the judge, Ul-Haque possessed 
despite being an accused terrorist and a Muslim (R v Ul-Haque: [95]) 
— not only destroyed the evidentiary case against Ul-Haque but led 
to the announcement of three inquiries into the practices of ASIO and 
the Australian Federal Police (Allard 2007b) and the real possibility 
of the instigation of future civil proceedings for compensation on the 
part of Ul-Haque (Allard 2007a).
Sewell deliberately cross-references Kaf ka’s The Trial in his 
portrayal of a state of exception in his play and, in fact, Agamben 
argues that Kafka depicted a state of exception in his novels in which 
an apparently innocent sequence of events, ‘the most innocent gesture 
or the smallest forgetfulness’ (Agamben 1998: 52), could inexplicably 
trigger prosecution and the imposition of a death sentence. It is 
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interesting, therefore, to find explicit references to such Kafka-esque 
conditions, and a repudiation of Kafka’s fictitious world, both in one 
of Cummins J’s rulings in Thomas’s trial ((Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Cth) v Thomas 2006a: [13]) and in Adams J’s ruling in Ul-Haque’s 
case (R v Ul-Haque: [31]).
Such judicial repudiation of a Kafka-esque state of exception has 
not met with unanimous approval. The heated debate which ensued 
after the quashing of Thomas’s convictions and the issue of the interim 
control order suggests that there is a division in the community between 
those who believe that the rule of law should be upheld in the ‘war 
against terrorism’ and those who believe that the law should be ‘servant, 
not master’ in such critical times (Devine 2006). As the President of 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission commented 
in a lecture in September 2006, ‘the culture of trial by media is a recipe 
for outrage when the courts reach a different verdict’ (von Doussa 
2006). The reaction by much of the media and many commentators 
to the quashing of Thomas’s convictions and the issue of the control 
order gestured towards a moral panic or collective persecution. Some 
opted for an emotive response. The Australian, for instance, featured 
the appalled reactions of relatives of the Bali victims under the heading 
‘Fury after Jihad Jack walks free’ (Robinson 2006). Jack Thomas, the 
scapegoat, was represented as doubly culpable, responsible not simply 
for his own misdeeds in ‘travelling to Afghanistan to serve the cause 
of terror’ but also, somehow, responsible for the flaws in the legal 
system which permitted him to ‘[avoid] punishment for this evil act’ 
(The Australian 21 August 2006). Rhetoric appropriate to wartime 
was used. The decision was ‘a victory for our enemies’ and ‘a defeat 
for common sense and Australia’s national security’ (The Australian 21 
August 2006).
Despite such emotive responses, one commentator, Gerard 
Henderson (2006), accused the ‘civil liberties lobby’ of resorting to 
‘hyperbole’, exaggeration and dramatic but unrealistic comparisons; 
in his view, Australians capable of drawing rational conclusions from 
the facts before them supported the imposition of the control order. 
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Here, rational discourse is privileged over emotive discourse, which 
according to Henderson is part of the weaponry of the misguided ‘civil 
rights lobby’. Similarly, another commentator described the critics of 
anti-terrorism measures as having ‘a tenuous understanding of reality’ 
(Merritt 2006).
Deep misgivings were expressed about the role of what was 
described as ‘the blackest of black-letter law’ (The Australian 21 August 
2006), but in reality this was the application of a fundamental legal 
prohibition against the use of evidence obtained through torture. The 
‘civil libertarian types’, according to Henderson (2006), ‘focus on 
legal process’; they believe that ‘the rule of law trumps all’ in contrast 
to their critics, who ‘believe the law is servant, not master’ (Devine 
2006). Here, the implication is that the law should be a ‘servant’ to the 
Australian community rather than produce unpopular results like a 
capricious tyrant. Such statements are extraordinary because in normal 
circumstances positivism in the law, or adherence to black-letter law 
and its legal technicalities, meets with the approval of conservative 
thinkers who direct their criticism towards legal activism.
However, these are not ordinary times. Chris Merritt wrote that 
‘Jihad Jack is on the wrong side in a war. And in war, different standards 
apply’ (Merritt 2006). More surprisingly a barrister, Peter Faris, also 
suggested that the rule of law should not apply in wartime and that 
‘we are at war, this is a war of terror’. This revealing faux pas was 
then quickly corrected: ‘a war against terror, I should say.’ In his view, 
in such critical times, it was inappropriate and undesirable for seven 
Australian High Court judges to ‘effectively run the war against terror 
and tell us what we can do and what we can’t do’ (Lateline 29 August 
2006). One of these High Court judges, Gleeson CJ, subsequently 
pointed out at the annual judicial conference in Canberra that courts 
sometimes had the unpopular task of upholding the law ‘in the face of 
public impatience and fear’; he also stated that the rule against forced 
confessions may be viewed as an ‘inconvenience’, but the alternative 




The contribution of such an eminent public figure to the debate 
temporarily stymied some (but not all) critics of the ‘civil rights lobby’. 
However, extreme intolerance of dissenting views is one of the more 
alarming characteristics of the war on terror; those who fail to punish 
the ‘terrorist’ or to support the government in its efforts to see the 
‘terrorist’ punished, are represented as traitors whose misguided views 
and actions handicap the government in its attempts to fight terror 
and thereby endanger the Australian community.
The indignation and outrage which greeted the decision of the 
Victorian Court of Appeal to quash the convictions of Jack Thomas 
was illuminating: when the legal performances of the terror trials fail 
to condemn and isolate the accused terrorist, the rule of law comes 
under attack from commentators and community members.
Conclusion
In a state of exception, legal performances work within the power 
apparatus of the state. In the majority of legal performances considered 
above, we find support for Agamben’s contention that the state of 
exception prevails in contemporary Western societies and the rule 
of law carries little meaning. Biopolitical strategies utilised by the 
state to control and monitor the activities of the contemporary form 
of homo sacer, the accused terrorist, are accepted by the courts. The 
executive, with appropriate legislative endorsement, can exercise an 
extraordinary degree of power over the body of the accused terrorist. 
Legal performances confer legitimacy upon this regime.
The terror trials are designed with a predetermined outcome in 
which the guilt and need for containment of the accused terrorists 
are conclusively established. Antonia Quadara’s description of a 
hypothetical Australian trial of David Hicks as ‘an official performative 
sacrifice at the hands of the law’ (Quadara 2006: 147) has a broader 
application. Yet it is within the context of the Australian terror trials 
that we find, surprisingly, the application of the rule of law. Despite 
an attack on the rule of law by prominent members of the community, 
it seems that the contemporary state of exception is not absolute. 
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The lesson from the Thomas and Ul-Haque cases is that the courts, in 
reaching a final decision on the guilt or innocence of accused terrorists, 
are prepared to apply the rule of law.
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